Partial logics with two kinds of negation as a foundation for knowledge-based reasoning by Herre, H. et al.
Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica
REPORTRAPPORT
Partial logics with two kinds of negation as a foundation for 
knowledge-based reasoning
H. Herre, J.O.M. Jaspars and G. Wagner
Computer Science/Department of Software Technology
CS-R9574 1995
Report CS-R9574
ISSN 0169-118X
CWI
P.O. Box 94079
1090 GB  Amsterdam
The Netherlands
CWI is the National Research Institute for Mathematics
and Computer Science. CWI is part of the Stichting
Mathematisch Centrum (SMC), the Dutch foundation
for promotion of mathematics and computer science
and their applications.
SMC is sponsored by the Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research (NWO). CWI is a member of
ERCIM, the European Research Consortium for
Informatics and Mathematics.
Copyright © Stichting Mathematisch Centrum
P.O. Box 94079, 1090 GB  Amsterdam (NL)
Kruislaan 413, 1098 SJ  Amsterdam (NL)
Telephone +31 20 592 9333
Telefax +31 20 592 4199
Partial Logics with Two Kinds of Negation as a Foundation for
KnowledgeBased Reasoning
Heinrich Herre
 
 Jan Jaspars

and Gerd Wagner

 
Institut fur Informatik Univ Leipzig Augustusplatz  	 Leipzig Germany
herreinformatikunileipzigde

CWI PO Box 	
	 	 GB Amsterdam The Netherlands
jasparscwinl

Institut fur Informatik Univ Leipzig Augustusplatz  	 Leipzig Germany
gwinffuberlinde
Abstract
We show how to use model classes of partial logic to dene semantics of general knowledgebased reasoning
Its essential benet is that partial logics allow us to distinguish two sorts of negative information the absence
of information and the explicit rejection or falsication of information Another general advantage of
partial logic which we discuss in the rst part is that its metatheory is very close to the metatheory of
classical logic In the second part notions of minimal paraminimal and stable models are presented in terms
of partial logic and we show how the resulting denitions can be used to dene the semantics of knowledge
bases such as relational and deductive databases and extended logic programs
AMS Subject Classication  B	 B
 N N
 T
 T C
CR Subject Classication  D F F F F I I
Keyword and Phrases Partial logic semantics of knowledgebased reasoning
Note To appear in D Gabbay and H Wansing Eds What is Negation Kluwer  Jan Jaspars
was sponsored by CECproject LRE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  Introduction
As opposed to theoretical reasoning such as in mathematics where all predicates are exact
 
and a single contradiction destroys the entire theory knowledgebased reasoning has to be able
to deal with inexact predicates eg from empirical domains having truth value gaps and
with knowledge bases containing contradictory items but being still informative Therefore
partial logics allowing both for truthvalue gaps and for inconsistency are natural candidates
for modelling knowledgebased reasoning
In knowledge representation two dierent notions of falsity arise in a natural way Certain
facts are implicitly false by default by being not veried in any intended model of the knowl
edge base Others are explicitly false by virtue of a direct proof of their falsity corresponding
to their falsication in all intended models These two kinds of falsity in knowledge repre
sentation are captured by the two negations called weak and strong of partial logic

In the
monotonic base system of partial logic weak negation corresponds to classical negation by
 
In the sense of Korner Koe

This was already noticed in Wag
 Introduction  
virtue of a straightforward translation of partial logic into classical logic which is discussed
in section 	 In the nonmonotonic renements of partial logic discussed in sections 
 and
 weak negation corresponds to negationasfailure and hence can be used to express local
ClosedWorld Assumptions default rules and the like
As opposed to the traditional logical notion of a theory being a possibly deductively closed
set of formulas the emerging concept of a knowledge base KB is richer both in terms of
the expressive structure of a KB and in terms of the meaningful restrictions imposed upon
it Typically a KB consists of facts and various kinds of rules In this paper we shall
only consider deduction rules Facts correspond to sentences of an appropriately restricted
language and deduction rules correspond to nonschematic Gentzen sequents While facts
express extensional knowledge rules express intensional knowledge This dichotomy of the
knowledge representation language also aects the use of the universal quantier a generic
law for instance is rather expressed in the form of a rule and not by means of a universal
sentence
In real world knowledge bases like for instance relational or deductive databases it is
essential to be able to infer negative information by means ofminimal resp stable reasoning
ie drawing inferences on the basis of minimal resp stable models Relational databases
being nite sets of tables the rows of which represent atomic sentences have traditionally been
viewed as nite models On this account answering a query F is rather based on the model
relationM

j F  where M

is the nite interpretation corresponding to the database 
and not on an inference relation However especially with respect to the generalization of
relational databases eg in order to allow for incomplete information it seems to be more
adequate to regard a relational database as a set of atomic sentences A

 and to infer a query
F whenever it holds in the unique minimal model of A

 ie
A

 F  MinModA

  ModF M

j F
While minimal models are adequate for denite extensional knowledge bases such as rela
tional databases a renement of the notion of minimality called paraminimality is needed
to capture the inclusiveness of disjunctive knowledge Minimal and paraminimal models are
discussed in section 

It turns out that for a deductive knowledge base corresponding to a set of sequents
minimal resp paraminimal models are not adequate because they are not able to capture
the directedness of rules We therefore propose stable models as the intended models of
deductive knowledge bases in section  We show that Gelfonds and Lifschitzs notion of an
answer set of an extended logic program GL corresponds to a special case of our notion
of a stable model of a sequent set
Since in practice large knowledge bases cannot be expected to be free of inconsistent in
formation one needs a notion of inference which is able to tolerate inconsistency and at the
same time still as logically conservative as possible In order to deal with possibly inconsistent
KBs the simplest way is to refer to minimally inconsistent fourvalued models as proposed in
Pri In summary we get an orthogonal combination of minimally inconsistent paramin
imally stable models as the preferred models of a deductive knowledge base
 Preliminaries 
 Preliminaries
A signature   hRel ExRelConstFuni consists of a set of relation symbols Rel a set
ExRel  Rel of exact relation symbols a set of constant symbols and a set of function
symbols
The set of all variables Var is fx

 x
 
   g we will also use x y    however U
denotes the set of all ground terms of  The logical functors are  j	
  where
 j and 	 are called weak negation strong negation exclusive disjunction and material
implication respectively

L is the smallest set containing the atomic formulas of  and
being closed with respect to the following conditions if FG  L then fF F F 
G F  G F jG F 	 G xF 
xFg  L
L

 denotes the corresponding set of sentences closed formulas For sublanguages of
L formed by means of a subset F of the logical functors we write LF With respect
to a signature  we dene the following sublanguages At  L  the set of all atomic
formulas also called atoms Lit  L fg the set of all literals Lit

 the set of
ground literals also called Herbrand basis and XLit  Lit  fl  l  Litg the
set of all extended literals We introduce the following conventions When L
 
 L is
some sublanguage L
 

denotes the corresponding set of sentences If the signature  does not
matter we omit it and write eg L instead of L Furthermore
e
X  f F  F  Xg
Let L  L be a nonempty language An operation C  
L
 
L
is called an inference
operation and the pair hLCi is said to be an inference system The corresponding inference
relation  is dened by X  F i F  CX An inference operation relation is called a
consequence operation relation if it satises Inclusion Reexivity Idempotence Transi
tivity and Monotony hLCi is called a deductive system if C is a consequence operation
satisfying Compactness
A modeltheoretic system hL I ji is determined by a language L a set I whose elements
are called interpretations and amodel relation j IL between interpretations and formulas
With every modeltheoretic system hL I ji we can associate a model operator Mod
I
 a
consequence operation C
I
 and a consequence relation j
I
in the following way Let X  L
then the associated model operator is dened as Mod
I
X  fI  I  I j Xg where I j X
i for every F  X  I j F  The associated consequence operation is dened by C
I
X 
fF  L  Mod
I
X  Mod
I
F g and nally X j
I
F i F  C
I
X For a subset K  I
the theory of K denoted by ThK is dened by ThK  fF  L  I j F fa I  Kg
A modeltheoretic system hL I ji is called compact if C
I
is compact An inference system
hLC
L
i is called correct resp complete with respect to the modeltheoretic system hL I ji
i C
L
X  C
I
X resp C
L
X  C
I
X In the case of completeness we also say that
hL I ji represents hLC
L
i
IfX is a set of sets then FinX denotes its restriction to nite elements If Y is an partially
ordered set then MinY  denotes the set of all minimal elements of Y  ie MinY   fX 
Y j X
 
 Y  X
 
 Xg and MaxY  denotes the set of all maximal elements of Y  ie
MaxY   fX  Y j X
 
 Y  X
 
 Xg

Possible extensions of our framework may in addition include negation	as	inconsistency 
  intensional
implication 
 and modal operators for denite and persistent belief
 Partial Logics with Two Kinds of Negation 
 Partial Logics with Two Kinds of Negation
In this section we start with a brief introduction of partial modeltheory and then we present
their underlying axiomatics Since partial logic adopts its name from its alternative at the
very core of denotational semantics consisting of a shift from total to partial truthvalue
assignments this order of presentation seems most natural
More specically we begin with a presentation of partial rstorder models Then we
will discuss some issues of the expressivity of certain languages for reasoning on the basis of
partial models An essential feature of partial models is the fact that they allow to distinguish
between two types of extensional

negative information ie between the explicit falsity and
the nontruth of a proposition
After this we will show how partial rstorder logics can be translated into classical rst
order logic This result does not mean that partial logic is abundant

but rather shows
how wellknown metatheoretic theorems can be adopted from classical logic An immediate
consequence which is directly relevant for this paper is compactness
In the third subsection we will present Gentzenstyle axiomatizations of partial logics
Other styles of derivation like Hilbertstyle axiomatization and natural deduction are also
possible The reasons for us to chose in favor of the Gentzenstyle comes down to its meta
theoretical convenience and its brevity
 Model Theory
The modeltheory of partial logic is slightly deviant from the standard Tarskian one of classical
logic The only dierence is that the predicate structure is somewhat richer As already
stressed above the central idea of partial logic is the distinction between falsity and non
truth In the partial predicate logics which we will discuss this distinction is implemented by
assigning a positive and a negative extension to each predicate
Denition  Interpretation Let   RelExRelConstFun be a signature A par
tial interpretation I consists of
 A set U
I
	 the universe or domain of I

 an assignment c
I
 U
I
to every constant symbol c  Const

 an assignment of a function f
I
 U
arf	
I
 U
I
to every function symbol f  Fun	 where
arf denotes the arity of f 

 an assignment of a pair hR
I

e
R
I
i to every relation symbol R  Rel such that

Roughly speaking extensionality says that the information is only about one specic information state or
model Intensional information comes from other information state which are related in one way or another to
the information state at hand An example of an intensional treatment of negation can be found in intuitionistic
logic In this setting    means that every hypothetical verication of   will lead to a contradiction In other
words for determining the truth of    we need to take later states of information which contain more
information than the current one into account

Opponents of partial logic may argue that the translation actually proves the abundance of partial logic
We disregard such an abstract position because for practical purposes partial logic arises as the most natural
model	theoretic method for interpreting the two kinds of extensional negative information that we mentioned
above
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R
I

e
R
I
 U
arR	
I

and in the special case of an exact relation symbol R  ExRel	
R
I

e
R
I
 U
arR	
I

where arR denotes the arity of R
While many predicates from the ontology of empirical domains are inexact ie have truth
value gaps analytical predicates such as equality or being a prime number and legally
dened predicates such as being eligible or having a certain nationality are exact
In the sequel we shall often simply say interpretation instead of partial interpretation
The class of all partial interpretations is denoted by I

 We dene the classes of
coherent sometime also called valued of total and of total coherent or valued 
interpretations by
I
c
  fI  I

  R
I

e
R
I
  for all R  Relg
I
t
  fI  I

  R
I

e
R
I
 U
arR	
I
for all R  Relg
I

  I
c
  I
t

The satisfaction relation j between an interpretation a valuation and a formula is dened
inductively on the complexity of formulas F  L and F  L Such a dichotomous
induction is needed because verication and falsication are independent truthvalue assign
ments in partial logic


A valuation over an interpretation I is a function   Var  U
I

which can naturally be extended to arbitrary terms by
ft
 
     t
n
  f
I
t
 
     t
n

Note that for a constant c being a ary function we have c  c
I
 For a tuple t
 
     t
n
we will also write

t when its length is of no relevance We write 	 
x
 if two valuations 	 
are equal except for the variable x 	y  y for all y  V ar n fxg
Denition  Satisfaction Relation
I   j  Rt
 
       t
n
 i ht
 
       t
n
i  R
I
I   j  Rt
 
       t
n
 i ht
 
       t
n
i 
e
R
I
I   j  F G i I   j  F and I   j  G
I   j  F G i I   j  F or I   j  G
I   j  F i I   j  F
I   j  xF i I   j  F for all   
x

I   j  	xF i I   j  F for certain   
x

All other cases of formula composition are treated by the following DeMorganstyle rewrite
rules expressing the falsication of compound formulas

Most often these two relations are also written in a dierent fashion eg j for verication and j for
falsication Such a treatment is needed when the strong negation  is not available In this paper we will
not deal with strong negation free sublanguages
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 F G  F  G  F G  F  G
 xF x  
xF x  
xF x  xF x
F  F  F  F
and the denitions for exclusive disjunction
F jG  F  G  G F 
and material implication
F 	 G  F G
in the sense that for every rewrite rule LHS  RHS  we dene
I  j LHS i I  j RHS
Notice that conjunction and disjunction resp the universal and the existential quantier
are interdenable via the DeMorgan rules and consequently it is sucient in denitions and
proofs to treat the functors  

Denition  Model Relation The model relation between an interpretation and a for
mula F  L is also denoted by j
 it is dened by
I j F i I  j F for every   U
I
Var
If I j F for every F  X and I  I

	 then I is said to be a model of X
For   
 c t  Mod

denotes the model operator associated with the system hL I

 ji
and j

and C

denote the corresponding consequence relation and operation ie X j

F
i Mod

X  Mod

F  A set X is satisable i Mod

X  
Denition  Satisfaction Set Let I  I

	 and X  L Then
Sat
I
X  f  U
I
Var
 I  j Xg
Denition 	 Logical Equivalence Let FG  L The formulas F and G are logically
equivalent	 symbolically F 

G	 i for all I  I

	 Sat
I
F   Sat
I
G
Note that this denition of equivalence does not capture uniform substitutability For example
pp 
c
q q but pp j
c
q q In general substitutability of F by G can be
regained by requiring that F 

G and G 

F 
It is not hard to show that the general case of I

 can be reduced to classical logic
Because the propositions F and F are completely independent they can be understood as
two dierent propositions in a twovalued setting This can be made explicit by a dichotomous
translation function which has been given in a slightly dierent way by GilmoreGil
 but
can also be found in FefermanFef
 or LangholmLan 
Denition 
 Gilmore translation The Gilmore translation function g is a pair ht fi
with
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R

t
t
 R
t


t R

t
f
 R
f


t
F 
t
 F
f
F 
f
 F
t
F G
t
 F
t
G
t
F  G
f
 F
f
G
f

xF 
t
 
xF
t

xF 
f
 xF
f
F 
t
 F
t
F 
f
 F
t
where we have introduced the new relation symbols R
t
and R
f
which are intended to capture
the truth and the falsity extension of R
If   hRelExRel ConsFunci is a signature then we dene 
g
to be the signature
hRel
g
Rel
g
ConsFunc such that Rel
g
 ExRel  fR
t
 R
f
j R  Relg Furthermore if I is
a interpretation we write I
g
for the 
g
interpretation such that I and I
g
coincide with
respect to Cons and Func and for R  Rel  R
t

I
g
 R
I
 and R
f

I
g

e
R
I
 By a simple
inductive argument it can be shown that
I  j F i I
g
  j F
t
for all Ivaluations  	
The translation is surjective which implies that we even have the following more drastic
equivalences
Proposition  If X  L and F  L	 then
X j

F  X
t
j

F
t


X j
c
F  X
t
 Y j

F
t
with Y  fG
t
 G
f
 j G  Lg

X j
t
F  X
t
 Z j

F
t
with Z  fG
t
G
f
j G  Lg

Corollary  LowenheimSkolem Let   
	t or c If a formula F  L is satisable	
then it also has a countable model	 ie there exists I  Mod

F  such that U
I
is countable
Corollary  Let   
	t or c
 Compactness X  L is satisable i every nite subset of X is
satisable
 Finiteness X j

F i there is a nite set Y  X such that Y j

F 
 Propositional Expressivity and Normal Forms
Let us suppose that we only deal with the sublanguage Prop  L

 A
interpretation I can then be understood as a partial truthvalue assignment V
I
 At



f g
 The simple reason to do so is that we wish to discuss the expressivity of connectives
rather than that of quantiers The corresponding partial truthvalue assignment V
I
P  is
the subset of f g such that
  V
I
P  i P  D
I
  V
I
P  i P  D
I
In other words f g stands for overvalued fg for falsity fg for truth and  for under
valued The set of all truthvalues f fg fg f gg will be called four The subsets

The stronger versions with G  At
 also hold
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f fg fgg ffg fg f gg and ffg fgg will be denoted by three three and two
respectively
Of course this denition settles a  correspondence between partial interpretations and
partial truthvalue assignments For this reason we will drop the Iindex in the sequel of
this subsection For the full collection of partial truthvalue assignments we write V

 V
c

V
t
and V

refer to the obvious subclasses of partial truthassignments
The question arises whether our propositional language that we work with is expressive
enough to describe the content of a partial truthassignment V  V

 In other words can
every extensional connective be dened in terms of the connectives of the language This
property is also called expressive or functional completeness of the language In classical
logic we know that the language L

 is adequate for this purpose In partial logic
this is certainly not the case by means of these two connectives we can not express that a
proposition is not true P can not be dened by means of P   and  alone
These issues of expressivity are not of purely theoretical concern For example given a
subclass of models which behaves computationally very well then we want to know the exact
language which describes such a class

Furthermore if we want to axiomatize an extension
of the model class I

 then we need to know whether connectives are independent or can
be dened in terms of others We know for sure that the former class requires explicit
reference within such an axiom system Last but not least we also want to have a formal
understanding what we really gain in expressivity once we extend a model class For example
the formula P P  has no models but is csatisable which makes clear that  really
adds expressive power to the connectives  and 
In other words given a class of models we wish to know the underlying languages of both
super and subclasses
Formally we interpret an nary connective 
 as a function 
 from ntupels of truthvalues
to truthvalues

  val
n
 val
with val being one of the earlier mentioned truthvalue sets
ffg fgg  val  f fg fg f gg
For example the weak negation  is interpreted as the function
 x 

fg if   x
fg otherwise
The question arises whether this weak negation is sucient as an addition to  and  to
obtain functional completeness for the classes V
c
 V
t
and V

 The answer is nearly We
only need to add some additional nullary connectives u and o which obtain the following
denotation u   and o  f g
The following table presents for all four classes the associated set of connectives which
yields functional completeness

Eg Langholms description of Horn clauses in partial logic Lan in terms of transferring the classical
semantic properties of such clauses to partial logic and then dene the language which has this properties
over partial models
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V


V
c
u
V
t
o
V

u o
In the eld of partial logic many more expressivity results are known for welldened sub
classes of V
c
and V

see Bla  Lan Ben
 Mus and Thi An important
result is the functional completeness of u with respect to the persistent connectives over
V
c
by Blamey in Bla 

A connective 
 is persistent i its interpretation 
 is monotone
over 

i  f     ng  x
i
 y
i
 
 x
 
     x
n
  
 y
 
     y
n

In V

we also need o for getting the same complete expressivity over the same class of
persistent connectives Mus
 
In most cases functional expressivity of a propositional language can be demonstrated
by means of socalled normal forms in the language which species the class of satisfying
truthvalue assignments in an obvious way In this section we only discuss the language with
complete expressivity for V

 V
c
 V
t
and V


Denition  If X is a set of formulas	 then 
X  f
F j F  Xg for a given unary
connective 
 If X  fF
 
     F
n
g is a nonempty nite set of formula then
V
X  F
 

   F
n
and
W
X  F
 
    F
n

  
A conjunct form is a formula of the form

W 

X 

Y 

Z	 such that WX Y Z  At

	
A conjunct form is a conjunct form as in  with W  Y  X Z  At

and W  Y 
X Z   A cconjunct form is a conjunct form as in  with W X   Analogously	
a tconjunct form is obtained by taking Y  Z   and for a conjunct form we stipulate
Y  Z  
A disjunct form is a formula of the form

W 

X 

Y 

Z such that WX Y Z  At

 		
The notions of disjunct form are dened analogously A disjunct form in L is said to
be a clause
A prenex formula F  L has the form Q
 
x
 
  Q
n
x
n
Gx
 
     x
n
 y
 
     y
m
 where G
is quantier free and Q
i
 f
 g G is called the matrix of F and is denoted by matrixF
	
The connective set fg has complete expressivity over so	called closed persistent connectives in V
c
Ben Closed connectives always obtain a classical value fg or fg if all its arguments have classical
values
 

This result for persistence gives us immediately an answer to the question for which class of formulas
	satisability is the same as c	satisability all the formulas which can be dened in terms of u  and 
  
Of course this is not a well	dened formula but because of commutativity of  and  this choice is unique
op to logical equivalence
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Proposition  Propositional Normal Form Every propositional formula is equivalent
to either a disjunction of conjunct forms	 	 o or u Analogously	 such a formula is
equivalent to 	 u or a disjunction of conjunct forms	 and tequivalent to 	 o or a
disjunction of tconjunct forms
In general it is not possible to obtain precise predicate logical version of proposition 

Most often socalled prenex normal forms are used to dene versions of the normal form
result above for the predicate logical case
Proposition 	 Prenex Normal Form For every formula F x
 
     x
n
  L there
are prenex formulas Gx
 
     x
n
 Hx
 
     x
n
  L such that
 F 

G	 and F 

H

 matrixG 
W
X	 X is a set of conjunct forms	 matrixH 
V
Y 	 Y is a set of disjunct
forms
 Proof Theory
In this subsection we will present sequent calculi for partial logics As mentioned earlier
other styles of derivation calculi are also possible There are several reasons to chose for the
sequential style First they make the axiomatic dierences between dierent partial logics
and classical logic immediately visible Second metatheoretic proofs about the relations
between deduction and modeltheory such as correctness and completeness proofs benet
from a sequential proof theory Third in many cases sequential systems turn out to be
shorter
 
For example general completeness results for functionally complete languages
can be easily be transformed to completeness proofs for poorer sublanguages
Denition  Sequent A sequent s is an expression of the form
F
 
     F
m
 G
 
     G
n
where F
i
 G
j
 L for i       m and j       n The body of s	 denoted by Bs	 is
given by fF
 
     F
m
g	 and the head of s	 denoted by Hs	 is given by fG
 
     G
n
g Seq
denotes the class of all sequents s such that HsBs  L
Denition  Model of a Sequent Let I  I

 Then	
I j F
 
     F
m
 G
 
     G
n
i

im
Sat
I
F
i
 

jn
Sat
I
G
j

For S  Seq Mod

S and S j

s are dened analogously as in Denition 	
Denition  Sequential inference A sequential inference rule R has the form
s
 
  s
n
s
n 
	
 
In partial predicate logic this advantage of sequential systems does not become sharply evident A branch
of partial logic which surely benets in this respect from sequential axiomatization is partial modal logic as
have been shown in JasparsJas
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with s
i
 Seq for all i  f     ng The elements of fs
 
     s
n
g are called the assumptions
of R	 and s
n 
is called the conclusion of R If n  	 that is rules without assumptions	 we
say that R is axiomatic	 and simply write s
 
 A sequential system s is a set of sequential
inference rules Every conclusion of an axiomatic rule in s is said to be sderivable in steps
If m   then a sequent s is said to be sderivable in m steps if there exists a rule
s
 
s
k
s
 s
such that for all i  f     kg the sequents s
i
are sderivable in less than m steps A sequent
is called sderivable if it is sderivable in a certain nite number of steps These sequents
X  Y are called ssequents	 and we write 
s
X  Y 
Below we will present sequential systems for the partial logics which have been discussed
earlier As usual we distinguish structural rules from introduction rules Structural rules are
syntactically independent of the logic which we are axiomatizing Introduction rules stipulate
the meaning of logical functors in a prooftheoretic fashion Logical functors are introduced
both in the head of a sequent lintroduction and in the body of a sequent rintroduction
Furthermore we distinguish between rules which introduce a new compound proposition as
being true and those which dene the falsity of a new compound proposition which then
appears in the scope of the strong negation  within the conclusion of the rule
 
Every
introduction rule is specied by an abbreviation of the form x
v

 where x  flrg left or
right v  ftrue falseg and 
 species the connective or quantier which is introduced
Below we give a presentation of the rules which are relevant for the axiomatization of
partial logic Instead of X  fFg we write XF 
Structural Rules
F 
 F start
X 
 Y X  X

  Y  Y

X


 Y

mon
X F 
 Y X


 F  Y

X X


 Y  Y

cut
This set of structural rules will be called struc
 
In FLV so	called quadrants have been introduced which can be understood as a kind of four	placed
sequents XjX
 
 Y jY
 
 The truth	conditional reading of such a quadrant is that all models which verify all
members of X and falsify all members of X
 
 verify at least one member of Y or falsify at least one member of
Y
 
 This approach makes falsity introduction possible within the derivational format and is therefore somewhat
more elegant If we wish to axiomatize 	free sublanguages such a choice would even be necessary in order
to obtain complete inference systems in a sequential fashion
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Truth Rules
X 
 F  Y
X F 
 Y
l
true

X F 
 Y
X 
F  Y
r
true

X F G
 Y
X F G
 Y
l
true

X 
 F  Y X


 G  Y

X X


 F G  Y  Y

r
true

X 
 Y l
true

X 
 o  Y r
true
o
X F tx
 Y 
X  xF 
 Y
l
true

X 
 F cx  Y 
X 
 xF  Y
r
true


  t substitutable 
  c is a closed term
for x in F not occurring in X  Y
Furthermore l
true
 and r
true
 are the rules which evolve from substituting  for 
in the rules l
true
 and r
true
 respectively For the ary connective u we have only
one rule the same as as for  l
true
u  Xu Y  All these rules together are called
true
Falsity rules
X F 
 Y
X F 
 Y
l
false

X 
 F  Y
X 
F  Y
r
false

X F 
 Y X

 G
 Y

X X

 F G
 Y  Y

l
false

X 
F G  Y
X 
F G  Y
r
false

X 
  Y r
false

X u
 Y l
false
u
X F cx
 Y 
X xF 
 Y
l
false

X 
F tx  Y 
X 
xF  Y
r
false

 and  as in
true above	
r
false
o is the same as r
false
 with  replaced by o For  we have the same rules as for
 Simply substitute F for the occurrences F in l
false
 and r
false
 and we obtain
l
false
 and r
false
 respectively The complete set of these falsity rules will be called
false
We dene the following sequential systems
  struc  true n fr
true
o l
true
ug
c  struc  true n fr
true
r
true
og  false n fr
false
og
t  struc  true n fl
true
 l
true
ug  false n fl
false
ug
  c  t  fl
v
ur
w
o j vw  ftrue falsegg
Below we will present completeness results of these systems with respect to the correspond
ing modeltheoretic consequence relations This completeness only holds when we presuppose
the absence of exact predicates within the underlying signature If  contains exact predi
cates we need to strengthen the systems c and  with a straightforward compensation for the
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loss of fr
true
g Let L
ex
 be the sublanguage of L which consists of all the proposition
that only contain exact predicates The systems cex and ex evolve from adding the rule
r
true
ex
 to c and  respectively This additional rule has the following form
XF  Y F  L
ex

X  F Y
r
true
ex

Observation  The dierences between 	 c	 t	 and  can also be described by means of
relativized versions of contraposition In  we have that


X  Y  

Y  X
This is a form of contraposition for strong negation In all the other systems we obtain this
contraposition rule at least for the weak negation The systems c and t have mixed versions
of the rule of contraposition

c
X  Y  
c
Y  X

t
X  Y  
t
Y  X
The following proposition presents the completeness of the sequential systems of the pre
vious paragraph In fact for the logic whose underlying language is functionally complete
these results can be already obtained by means of the translation of denition  
Proposition 
 Completeness Let s be 	 c	 t or 	 and let  refer to the associated
model class	 
	 c	 t or 	 respectively If  is a signature with no exact predicates	 then for
all nite sets X Y  L we have

s
X  Y i j

X  Y
If  contains exact predicates	 then the completeness result only holds for  and t For  and
c	 we have

ex
X  Y i j
c
X  Y and 
ex
X  Y i j

X  Y
The partial results of soundness are the lefttoright directions of the equivalences in the
above proposition These results can be checked by a straightforward induction on the length
of derivation
In order to give an ordinary Henkinstyle proof of these completeness theorems we need
to dene the notion of saturated sets This is a generalization of the notion of maximally
consistent sets which is needed to prove the completeness for partial logics with poorer
expressivity Especially when the weak negation is lacking the requirement of maximal
consistency is too strong
Denition  Saturation Let s be a sequential inference system A set X  L is
called ssaturated i for all nite sets X
 
 Y
 
 L and X
 
 X
If 
s
X
 
 Y
 
then Y
 
X   	

A set X  L is called stermsaturated i X is saturated and for every xF  X there
exists a constant c in  such that F xc  X
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Note that for every ssaturated X there exists no nite X
 
 X such that 
s
X
 
 
This property captures the sconsistency of X 
 
Taking Y
 
in 	
 to be a singleton tells us
that ssaturated sets are closed under sdeduction If Y
 
has multiple elements the denition
tells us that every disjunctive conclusion from X breaks down into at least one element of
X  In other words the information in X does not contain disjunctive uncertainty Complete
certainty is captured by the dention of termsaturation
A further relevant observation here is that if a sequential system s contains struc and a
rule
XF  Y
X  F Y
 then ssaturated sets are the same as maximally sconsistent sets
Lemma  Generalized Lindenbaum Lemma Let X and Y be two nite subsets of the
language L	 and let s  f c t g If 
s
X  Y 	 then there exists a ssaturated set
Z  L such that X  Z and Y  Z  
The standard Lindenbaum lemma can be obtained by taking Y   in the general formu
lation above Because saturation is the same as maximal consistency for systems with the
ltrue rule for negation the classical result is the same as saying that every consistent set
is a subset of a maximal consistent set
The generalization of the classical Lindenbaum lemma is due to Aczel and Thomason  The
generalization of the classical result evolved from independent succesful attempts to prove
the completeness of intuitionistic predicate logic Acz  Tho 
Most often the proof of the generalized Lindenbaum lemma is presented by making use
of syntactic expressivity of the language that one works with In fact the set of rules struc
is enough to obtain the result Jas If 
s
X  Y  and fF
i
g
iIN
is an enumeration of the
language we dene the following sequence of sets of formulas
X

 X
X
n 


X
n
 fF
n
g if 
s
X
n
 F
n
 Y
X
n
otherwise
The limit of this sequence is an ssaturated set which contains X and does not intersect Y 
In the completeness proofs of partial predicate logics we need termsaturated sets instead
of saturated sets The cheap trick to obtain these termsaturated sets is to extend the
language with a countably innite number of additional constants also called parameters
Let L
 
 be such an extension of L and let X and Y be two nite subsets of the latter
language
Corollary  If 
s
X  Y then there exists an stermsaturated Z  L
 
 such that X  Z
and Z  Y  
This result immediately follows from lemma  and by taking a unique fresh parameter as
an instantiation for each existentially quantied formula to obtain the desired termsaturated
set
 
If 	
s
X
 
 
 then 	 X
 
 F for all F by application of mon Note that a sequential system s which
contain the rules struc is conistent i 	
s

  

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The following lemma which is also called the truth lemma tells us that a termsaturated
set veries exactly those formulas which it contains To formulate this result properly we
associate with every stermsaturated set X  L an interpretation I
s
X
U
I
s
X
 the set of all closed terms of 
f
I
s
X
 f for all functions and constants f 
P
I
s
X
 f

t j P 

t  Xg
e
P
I
s
X
 f

t j P 

t  Xg for all predicates P 
Lemma  Truth Lemma Let s be a system which contains the rules struc	 and let X
be stermsaturated
I
s
X
j F  F  X
The proof of this lemma consists of a fairly straightforward induction on the construction
of formulas In fact every connective or quantier only uses its own introduction rules This
settles the completeness result also for poorer languages over the dierent model classes
The nal argument of the completeness result is an immediate consequence of lemma 
corollary  and lemma  Suppose that X and Y are nite subsets of L and 
s
X  Y 
According to corollary  there exists an stermsaturated set Z in a parametrized superlan
guage L
 
 such that X  Z and Y  Z   Lemma  above tells us that I
s
Z
j F for
all F  X and I
s
Z
j G for all G  Y  In other words j

X  Y where  refers to the
associated model class
 
 Minimal Reasoning
In this section we study several versions of nonmonotonic reasoning based on partial logic In
the rst subsection nonmonotonic reasoning is analysed in an abstract setting This is done
by using the concept of a deductive frame and its semantical counterpart a modeltheoretic
frame On this level of abstraction one can give a characterization of several kinds of partial
propositional logic The second subsection is devoted to Herbrand models Several theorems
are generalized to partial logics in particular the proposition about canonical models of
universal theory In the third subsection minimal models are investigated Then a new
class of models is introduced the !paraminimal models of a universal theory which are a
generalization of the good models of TEG	 Subsection 

 concludes with an investigation
of compactness properties of the introduced nonmonotonic model operators
 Inference Frames and ModelTheoretic Frames
Let L be a language and C  
L
 
L
an inference operation A condition on C is said
to be pure if it concerns the operation alone without regard to its interrelations to classical
consequence operation and truthfunctional connectives The most important pure conditions
are the following
X  Y  CX CY   CX Cut
X  Y  CX CX  CY  Cautious Monotony
X  Y  CX CX  CY  Cumulativity
CCX CX Idempotence
 
It is not hard to verify that I
s
Z
 I


 for all s	term	saturated sets Z
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An inference operation C is cumulative i C satises inclusion cut and cautious monotony
Besides the three conditions of cut cautious monotony and cumulativity Mak	 emphasizes
several mixed conditions of inference supraclassicality distributivity and rationality C is
said to be supraclassical if it extends the usual consequence operation Cn of classical logic
ie CnX  CX for all X  L Obviously these mixed conditions can be formulated for
any logic
 

For this purpose we use the following denition Her
Denition   LC
L
 C is said to be an inference frame i the following conditions
are satised
a L is a language
b C
L
is an inference operation on L satisfying inclusion	 idempotence and monotony
c C is an inference operation on L extending C
L
	 ie C
L
X  CX
 An inference frame LC
L
 C satises
a left absorption i C
L
CX  CX

b congruence or right absorption i C
L
X  C
L
Y  CX  CY 

c full absorption i it satises left absorption and congruence
If full absorption holds	 C
L
is called a monotonic basis for C
 An inference frame LC
L
 C is said to be a deductive frame if it is compact and
satises full absorption In this case	 C
L
is called a deductive basis for C
If C
L
is compact then the system LC
L
 C is called a compact inference frame A semantics
of an inference frame can be introduced by a modeltheoretic frame
Denition  L I j! is a modeltheoretic frame i
 L I j is a modeltheoretic system

 !  
L
 
M
is a functor such that !X Mod
I
X ! is called model operator
Every model operator ! corresponds to an inference operation C

X  Th!X C

extends C
I
and satises left absorption and hence LC
I
 C

 is an inference frame
A model operator ! is said to be invariant with respect to a modeltheoretic system
L I j i for all X  L !X  !C
I
X A modeltheoretic frame L I j! is said
to be compact if C
I
satises compactness it is called invariant if the model operator ! is
invariant wrt L I j
Proposition  If ! is invariant for the compact modeltheoretic system L I j then
LC
I
 C

 is a deductive frame
 
This point of view was assumed in FL
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In order to obtain a semantics for a nonmonotonic inference system LC we proceed in
two steps rst we have to nd an appropriate deductive basis LC
L
 C then we have to
construct a modeltheoretic semantics for the deductive system LC
L
 which will nally
yield a modeltheoretic frame representing the deductive frame LC
L
 C
A set X  L is said to be deductively closed i C
L
X  X  X is deductively consistent
in short dconsistent if C
L
X  L A deductive system LC
L
 is called explosive i there
exists a nite subset Y  L such that C
L
Y   L C
L
is negation explosive if there is a
unary functor n  L  L in the language such that for every X  L and every F  L the
following holds C
L
X  fFg  L i nF   C
L
X A set X  L is maximally dconsistent
if C
L
X  L and for every proper superset Y of X it holds that C
L
Y   L
Observation  The deductive systems L

 C

	 where   f c 
g	 are explosive and
negation explosive
Proof We consider only the case   c the other cases are analogous Let F be an arbitrary
sentence and G  F  F  Obviously C
c
G  L

 To prove that C
c
is negation
explosive let nF  
df
F  In general we have Mod
c
X   if and only if C
c
X  L
Let C
c
X  fFg  L then Mod
c
X  fFg   We prove that X j
c
F  Assume
X j
c
F  then there is a coherent model I j X such that I j F  hence I j F  But
then Mod
c
X  fFg   a contradiction Conversely assume X j
c
F  It is sucient
to show that Mod
c
X  fFg   Assume Mod
c
X  fFg   then there is a coherent
interpretation I such that I j XF  From this follows X j
c
F  a contradiction
Proposition  If LC
L
 is explosive then every dconsistent subset of L can be extended
to a maximally dconsistent set
Closed sets can be used to represent models and to build modeltheoretic semantics for
deductive systems Let LC
L
 be a deductive system and CsL  fX  L  C
L
X 
Xg For every subset M  CsL the following modeltheoretic system LM j can be
introduced Dene for F  L and m  M  m j F i F  m The modeltheoretic system
LM j represents a semantics for LC
L
 i C
M
 C
L
 then it is called a Lindenbaum
Tarskisemantics for LC
L
 Obviously a subset M  CsL represents a Lsemantics for
LC
L
 i for all consistent X  L it holds that C
L
X 
T
CsXM This observation
implies the following proposition
Proposition  A subset M  CsL represents a semantics for LC
L
 if for every d
consistent subset X  L and F  C
L
X there is an extension X  m	 m  M such that
F  m
For the construction of a semantics it is sucient to select a subset of CsL representing
the models X is said to be relatively maximal abbreviated rmaximal i there is a formula
F  L such that F  C
L
X and for every proper superset Y of X the condition F  C
L
Y 
is satised Obviously every rmaximal set is deductively closed Let rmaxL  CsL be
the set of all relatively maximal subsets wrt LC
L

Proposition  LindenbaumTarski Let LC
L
 be a deductive system	 X  L	 and
F  C
L
X	 then there exists a maximal extension Y  X	 such that F  Y 
 Minimal Reasoning 	
Observation  rmaxL is smallest subsystem of CsL representing a semantics for LC
L

We call it the LindenbaumTarski standard semantics LTsemantics
Denition  The inference operations C

 C
c
 C
t
 C

can be characterized as follows We
restrict our consideration to the case of propositional logic Let Ax

Prop be the following
set of formulas
 F 	 G 	 F 
 F 	 G 	 H 	 F 	 G 	 F 	 H
 F 	 G 	 H 	 G 	 F 	 H
 F 	 G 	 G 	 F 
   F 	 F
 F 	   F
 F 	 F
 F 	 F
 F  G 	 F
 F  G 	 G
 F 	 G 	 H 	 F  G 	 H
 F 	 F G
  G 	 F G
 F 	 H 	 G 	 H 	  F  G 	 H
Ax
t
Prop  Ax

Prop  fF 	 FF  FmPropg

Ax
c
Prop  Ax

Prop  fF 	 FF  FmPropg

Ax

Prop  Ax
c
Prop Ax
t
Prop
Rules Modus ponens  fF F 	 GG  FG formulas g
Observation  Completeness Theorem Let X  FmProp and   f c 
 tg
D

X is the smallest set containing XAx

Prop and closed with respect to modus ponens
Dene X 

F i F  D

X Then	
X j

F i X 

F
Proof scetch for j

 A set X of formulas is said to be complete i the following conditions
are fullled
F  X i F  X 
F G  X i fFGg  X 
F G  X i fFGg X  
 F  X i F  X 
 F  X i F  X 
 F  G  X i f F Gg X  
 F  G  X i f F Gg  X 
If X is complete then the set I  fl  Lit

  l  Xg is a partial model of X  To prove the
completeness theorem we assume X j

F but X 

F  By proposition 	 there is a maximal
set Y  X  Ax

such that Y 

F  It can be shown that Y is complete and deductively
closed This implies F  Y  hence F  Y  Then there exists a model I j Y such that
I j F  This is a contradiction to X j

F  
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Deductive frames can be semantically characterized as follows DH

Proposition  Let F  LC
L
 C be a deductive frame Then there exists a model
theoretic frame S  LM j! such that ! is invariant and S represents F 
The subsequent schema summarizes the general method for constructing a semantics for a
given inference system The main point here is to nd the right deductive basis in the set
fC
L
 LC
L
 C is a deductive frame g In many cases a deductive basis LC
L
 can be
chosen to be maximal Die

LC

Construction of a deductive frame

LC
L
 C

Construction of a modeltheoretic frame

LM j!
such that C
L
 C
M
 and C  C

 Herbrand Models
A partial Herbrand interpretation in the language L is one for which the universe equals
U and the function symbols have their canonical interpretation In this section we study
modeltheoretic frames based on Herbrand interpretations Let I
H

 be the set of all Her
brand interpretations in I

 with   f
 c t g and Mod
H

X  I
H

Mod

X X 
L The corresponding consequence relation j
H

is dened by X j
H

F  Mod
H

X 
Mod

F 
Denition 	 Diagram The diagram of a interpretation I is dened as D
I
 fl 
Lit

  I j lg
 
Observation 	 Partial Herbrand interpretations can be identied with their diagrams
Proof Let I  U f
I

fFun
 R
I

RRel
 be a Herbrand interpretation and t
 
     t
n

U Then I j Rt
 
     t
n
 i ht
I
 
     t
I
n
i  R
I
and I j Rt
 
     t
n
 i ht
I
 
     t
I
n
i 
e
R
I
 "From this follows that D
I
represents the set R
I

e
R
I
  
Herbrand interpretations over  can be considered as subsets of Lit

 Then the set
I
H

 coincides with 
Lit


	
 I
H
c
  fJ  Lit

  sth there is no l  At

 satisfying
fllg  J g I
H
t
  fJ  for all l  At

  fllgJ  g and I
H

  I
H
c
I
t

A consistent set X  L does not always have a Herbrand model
 
Notice that strictly speaking we dene the ground diagram and not the full diagram
 Minimal Reasoning  

Observation 
 There are consistent sets X  L

 without a Herbrand model X 
fP a 
xP x 	 P fx xP xg
Let   hRel ExRelConst Funi be a signature I a partial interpretation and U
 

U
I
 The restriction of I to U
 
is a partial interpretation J  denoted by J  I  U
 
 which
is dened by the following conditions
 the subset U
 
is closed with respect to the functions ff
I
 f  Fung and
fc
I
 c  Constg  U
 

 for every R  Rel ExRel R
J
 R
I
 U
arR	
 
and
e
R
J

e
R
I
 U
arR	
 

J is said to be a substructure of I if there is a subset U
 
 U
I
such that J  I  U
 

Proposition 	 Let 
x
 
  x
m
Ax
 
     x
m
 y
 
     y
n
  By
 
     y
n
  L be a univer
sal formula	Ax y quantier free	 I  Mod
c
	 and I 	 j By
 
     y
n
	 	 an evaluation
and 	y
 
  a
 
     	y
n
  a
n
 Let J be a substructure of I such that fa
 
     a
n
g  U
J

Then J  	 j By
 
     y
n

Proof Assume I 	 j By
 
     y
n
 and denote this condition by the expression I j
Ba
 
     a
n
 Since Ba
 
     a
n
 is universal it follows that for all b
 
     b
n
 U
I
the
condition I j Ab
 
     b
m
 a
 
   a
n
 is satised Because the formula Ax y does not
contain quantiers it follows J j Ab
 
     b
m
 a
 
   a
n
 provided fb
 
     b
m
 a
 
   a
n
g 
U
J
 This implies j Ba
 
     a
n
  
Corollary 
 Let I  I
c
	 F  L

 a universal sentence	 and J  I a substructure of
I Then I j F implies J j F 
Proposition  Let S  L be a universal theory of signature  and Const   If S
has a coherent model then it has a coherent Herbrand model
Proof Let I be a model of Mod
c
S A Herbrand model I

is dened as follows
 UI

  U
 ht
 
     t
n
i  R
I


i I j Rt
 
     t
n
 and ht
 
     t
n
i 
e
R
I


i
I j Rt
 
     t
n
 where R  Rel
From  follows for every quantier free formula Ax
 
     x
n
 and terms t
 
     t
n
 U
	 I

j At
 
     t
n
 i I j At
 
     t
n

Now let A  S and A  
x
 
   x
k
Gx
 
     x
k
 Assume I

j 
x
 
  x
k
Gx then
there is an evaluation  such that I

  j 
xGx By denition this is equivalent to the
existence of variable free terms t
 
     t
n
such that I

j Gt
 
     t
n
 by condition 	 this
is equivalent to I j Gt
 
     t
n
 But then I j 
x
 
  x
n
Gx which is a contradiction to
the assumption  
Observation  The relation j
H
c
is not axiomatizable	 ie there are decidable sets X  L
such that fF  X j
H
c
Fg is not recursively enumerable
Proof Let PA be the axioms of Peano Arithmetic in the signature   #  s then
PA j
H
c
F i F is true in the standard model of arithmetic This gives a contradiction to
G$odels incompleteness theorem 
 Minimal Reasoning  	
Proposition  Let S be a universal theory	 and F  xGx a closed existential formula
Then S j
H
c
G i S j
c
F 
Proof The implication  is trivial We show  Assume S j
H
c
F  but S j
c
xGx
then there is a partial model I  Mod
c
S such that I j xGx and hence I j 
xGx
Then S  f
x  Gxg has a model and by proposition there is a Herbrand model I

for
S  f
x Gxg Since I

j S this implies S j
H
c
F  a contradiction  
Proposition  cannot be generalized to universal sentences
Observation  For every language L	  containing a relational symbol of arity  	
there exists a universal theory S  L and a universal sentence F such that S j
H	
c
F but
S j
c
F 
Proof Wlog we assume that  contains a unary relational symbol P x Let S  fP t 
t  Ug then S j
H
c

xP x but obviously S j
c

xP x 
Denition 
 Persistent Formula A formula F  L is called persistent if for ar
bitrary partial Herbrand interpretations IJ over  satisfying I  J 	 and every substitution
  V ar  U
I
the condition I j F implies J j F
Observation  Every formula F  L  
 is persistent
Proof inductively on the complexity of F  Let l  Lit and I j l then l  I and
hence l  J for every extension J  I Let I j G  H then I j G or I j H By
induction hypothesis it holds J j G or J j H and hence I j G H Similarly this
is proved for F  G H 
Now let be F  xGx y and   V ar  U is a substitution such that I j
Gx y By induction hypothesis J j Gx y and this impliesJ j xGx y
Finally F  
xGx y Then for every substitution   x UI I j Gx y By
induction hypothesis I
 
j Gx y and since U
I
 U
J
it follows J j 
xGx y  
Proposition  Let S be a universal theory	 and F  xGx a closed existential sentence
Then the following conditions are equivalent
 S j
c
F 
 There are variable free substitutions 
 
     
n
such that S j
c
W
in
G
i
x
Proof Assume S j
c
F  since F is an existential sentence this is equivalent to S j
H
c
F 
This is the case if and only if for every Herbrand model I of S there is a substitution 
I
such
that I j
c
G
I
 From this follows that S j
H
c
W
fG
I
 I is an Herbrand model of Sg By
the compactness theorem for L
c
there is a nite set  of Herbrand models of S such that
S j
c
W
fG
I
 I  g  
Proposition  can also be proved for j
t
and j

 For j

this proposition is Herbrands
theorem
 Minimal Reasoning   
 Minimal Models
In the sequel we introduce several versions of minimal models we assume that all interpre
tations under consideration are Herbrand interpretations
Denition  Extension Let I and I
 
be two interpretations We say that I
 
extends
I	 symbolically I  I
 
	 if D
I
 D
I
 

This ordering of interpretations corresponds to the intuitive notion of information growth It
has also been called knowledge ordering in the literature
Denition  Minimally Inconsistent Models Let IncI  D
I

g
D
I
measure the
inconsistency of a fourvalued interpretation I Then
Mod
H
mi
X  fI  Mod
H

X  I
 
 Mod
H

X	 sth IncI
 
  IncIg
is the class of minimally inconsistent models of X  L
Minimally inconsistent models were introduced in Pri Like plain fourvalued models they
tolerate inconsistency but they are in a sense logically more conservative as the following
example shows
Example  Disjunctive Syllogism Fourvalued inference does not respect the Dis
junctive Syllogism	 but minimally inconsistent inference does
fp  q qg j

p	 but fp  q qg j
mi
p
Notice that whenever X  L has a coherent model then Mod
mi
X  Mod
c
X ie j
c
can
be viewed as a restriction of j
mi
to coherent knowledge bases
Denition  Minimal Models Let X  L	 and   fc 
 mig Then Mod
m

X 
MinMod
H

X is the class of all minimal models of X with respect to  Similarly	
Mod
max

X  MaxMod
H

X is the class of all maximal models of X
The following systems are important modeltheoretic frames L I
H

 jMod
m

 where  
fc 
g and L is a sublanguage of L and furthermore L I
H

 jMod
m
mi

Observation  There are theories T  L which are csatisable	 ie Mod
c
T   	 but
do not have minimal models Mod
m
c
T   
Proof Let T

be the theory of linear ordering with rst but without last element P is a
unary predicate satisfying the following property xP x  
v
uP u v  u 	 P v ie
P is a nonempty conal segment of the linear ordering Then every partial model of this
theory is not minimal
Observation  Let K  I
H

 An interpretation I  I
H

is said to be minimal in K if
I K	 and there is no J K such that J  I Then the following holds An interpretation
I  I
H

is minimal in I
H
t
if I is valued
 Minimal Reasoning  
From the results of section 	 the following observation can be easily derived
Observation  For every set S of universal sentences there is a set of clauses ClS such
that Mod

S  Mod

ClS	   f
 c tg
Proposition  Let S be a universal theory in L Every partial model from I
H
c
of S is
an extension of a minimal coherent model of S and can be extended to a maximal coherent
model of S
Proof Let S be given we may assume that S is a set of clauses Let I be a coherent
model of S and %I  fJ  J  IJ j Sg We show that every decreasing chain
I

 I
 
     I
n
   in %I has a lower bound Using Zorns lemma this implies
the existence of a minimal element which is a minimal partial coherent model of S Assume
I


T
n
I
n
 and I
n
j S for every n   We show that I

j S Choose C  S and
C  E
 
    E
k
 F
 
   F
l
 G
 
    G
m
 H
 
    H
n

where E
p
 F
q
 G
r
 H
s
 At Assume I

j C this is the case if and only if
I

j 
x

pk
E
p


ql
F
q


rm
G
r


sn
H
s

implying that I

j x
V
pk
E
p

V
ql
F
q

V
rm
  G
r

V
sn
H
s
 which is
equivalent to
I

j x

pk
E
p


ql
F
q


rm
G
r


sn
H
s

There is an evaluation   V ar U such that
I

j

pk
E
p
 

ql
F
q
 

rm
G
r
 

sn
H
s

"From this follows that fE
p
g  fF
q
g  I

  This implies the existence of a num
ber m   such that I
m
 fE
p
g  fF
q
g   On the other hand since I

j
V
rm
G
r
 
V
sn
H
s
 then by persistence of formulas without weak negation for ev
ery extension J  I

it holds J j
V
G
r
 
V
H
s
 Alltogether we may conclude
I
m
j
V
pk
E
p
 
V
ql
F
q
 
V
rm
G
r
 
V
st
H
s
 But then I
m
j 
xC and this is
a contradiction The proof for the existence of maximal models is analogous  
Proposition  holds also for 
valued and for total models Let Mod
max

T  be the set of
maximal models of T   c 

Proposition  Let S be a universal theory in L	 and 

S  fl  Lit

  S j

lg	


S  fl  Lit

  S j

lg Then

T
Mod
m

S  

S
 Lit


S
Mod
max

S  

S
Proof  Let l 
T
Mod
m

S then l  I for every I  Mod
H

S since every I  Mod
H

S
is an extension of some J  Mod
m

S Hence l  

S If l  

S then l  I for every
I  Mod
H

S and it follows I 
T
Mod
m

S
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 Let l  Lit

 
S
Mod
max

S then for every I  Mod
H

S l  I since I can be
extended to a maximal model J  Mod
H

S It follows that l  

S Now let l  

S
then S j l This implies l  I for every model I j S and in particular l 
S
Mod
max

S
hence l  Lit


S
Mod
max

S  
Denition  Paraminimal Models LetX  L	   c 
 mi	 andK  Mod
H

X
Then	
Mod
m

K X  MinfI  Mod
H

X 

K  Ig
is the set of all minimal supermodels ofK The setMod
pm

K X of paraminimal models
over K is the smallest set of models of X containing K and being closed with respect to
the condition
 if M  Mod
pm

K X then Mod
m

M  X  Mod
pm

K X
If in condition  the set M is assumed to be nite then the resulting set	 denoted by
Mod
fpm

K X	 is the set of nitely based paraminimal models over K Finally	 the set of
paraminimal models of X is dened by Mod
pm

X  Mod
pm

Mod
m

X X	 and the set of
nitely based paraminimal models by Mod
fpm

X  Mod
fpm

Mod
m

X X
The paraminimalmodel operator is the basis of the followingmodeltheoretic frames L I
H

 j
Mod
pm

 where   fc 
g and L I
H

 jMod
pm
mi
 Let LM j! be a modeltheoretic
frame based on a partial logic L

 The set of !paraminimal models of X  denoted by
Mod
pm

! X is dened by Mod
pm

!X X We introduce following notation C
fpm

X 
ThMod
fpm

Mod
m

X X Obviously C
pm
c
X  C
fpm
c
X  C
m
c
X
Our notion of a paraminimal model is a generalization of the good models dened in
TEG	 for classical theories In the next section we will combine the idea of paraminimality
with the idea of stability which is essential for an adequate interpretation of nonpersistent
sequents resp generalized logic programming rules
Paraminimalmodels can be classied with respect to a rank notion We set Mod
pm

 X 
 Mod
pm

 X  Mod
m

X and for   
Mod
pm

 #  X  Mod
pm

X

fMod
m

K X K  Mod
pm

Xg
and nally for limit ordinals
Mod
pm

X 

	
Mod
pm

X
A paraminimal model I  Mod
pm

X has rank  denoted by rkI   i I  Mod
pm

#
 X  Mod
pm

X The prank of X  abbreviated prkX is dened by prkX 
supfrkI  I  Mod
pm

Xg
Example  Let T  fa  b  c  d a  b 	 c  d  e  f c  d 	 e  fg Then the largest
paraminimal model of T is abcdef 
 since it is the minimal supermodel of the two minimal
models a and b it has rank  There are exactly two paraminimal models of rank  cdef and
bcdef 	 consequently prkT   
 Minimal Reasoning  
Observation  Let X  Prop contain persistent formulas only Then prkX 
Proof Let Min

I be the set of all minimal submodels of I and K be a set of submodels
of I being models of X  If I is a minimal supermodel of K then by the persistence of X it
holds that I 
S
K  We show that the rank hierarchy stabilizes at  ie Mod
pm

 X 
Mod
pm

 X Let I  Mod
pm

 X then there is a set M of submodels of I such that
M  Mod
pm

 X and I is a minimal supermodel of M  By the above remark I 
S
M 
Furthermore every J M can be represented by J 
S
Min

J  From this follows that
I 
S
MinI ie rkI  
If Y is a partially ordered set then we can select those elements from Y which are minimal
upper bounds of certain minimal elements of Y by means of an operator
PMin
 
Y   fX  Y j X
 
 Y  X
 
 X & Min
X
 
Y   Min
X
Y g
where Min
X
Y   fX
 
 MinY   X
 
 Xg We obtain the following corollary
Corollary  Let X  Prop contain persistent formulas only Then	
Mod
pm

X  PMin
 
Mod
H

X
Eventually an important question is which of the inference relations j
x
y
for x  m pm and
y  
 cmi is the natural choice for knowledge systems We shall see below that the answer to
this questions depends also on the logical expressiveness of the language of knowledge bases
In the simplest case where only extensional knowledge corresponding to sentences from
L is represented the preferred inference relation is based on paraminimal models
ie j
pm
mi
resp j
pm
c
if only consistent KBs are admitted as the following example illustrates
Example  Inclusive Disjunction Let X  fqc pa  pbg From this KB we
want to be able to infer pc	 but not pa  pb However	 X j

pc	 for   cmi	
but X j
m

pc	 since
Mod
m

X  ffqc pag fqc pbgg
and also	 X j
m

pa  pb	 which is not wanted Therefore	 we need paraminimal
reasoning
Mod
pm

X  ffqc pag fqc pbg fqc pa pbgg
and hence	 X j
pm

pa  pb
 Compactness Properties
We conclude this section with the investigation of compactness properties Let F  L I j
! be a modeltheoretic frame C

is semantically compact if for every set X  L the
following holds if !X
f
   for every nite subset X
f
 X then !X   In classical
logic compactness and semantical compactness coincide For arbitrarymodeltheoretic frames
this is not longer true The following facts clarify the relation between compactness and
semantical compactness ! is strongly semantical compact i for every set X  L and
formula   L the following holds if !X
f
 Mod   for every nite subset X
f
 X
then !X Mod   The following proposition shows the interrelation between these
properties
 Minimal Reasoning  
Proposition  Let F  L I j! be a modeltheoretic frame
 Assume LC
I
 is explosive If C

is compact then it is semantically compact
 Assume LC
I
 is negation explosive Then C

is strongly compact if and only if it is
compact
Let C be an inference operation on the language L and C
f
be the nitary restriction of
C ie domC  fX  X  L X is nite g and C
f
X  CX for all nite subsets X
of L Let C be monotonic and 

C
f
X 
S
Y FinX	
C
f
Y  

can be considered as
an operator extending nitary inference operation to innitary ones and if C is monotonic
then 

C
f
  C If C is monotonic and compact then 

C
f
  C ie C is uniquely
dened by its nitary restriction via 

 In case C is not compact but monotonic 

C
gives an approximation of C from below If C does not satisfy monotony then there is no
welldened operator  allowing to reconstruct the operation C from its nitary restriction
C
f
 To analyse this phenomenon we use the following notions from Her
Denition  Let LC
L
 be a deductive system DLC
L
  fC  LC
L
 C is a deductive
frame g
 D
f
LC
L
  fC  C is nitary and LC
L
 C is a deductive frame g
 ILC
L
 
fC  LC
L
 C is an inference frame g
 A functor   D
f
LC
L
  ILC
L
 is said to be an extension operator if for every
C  DLC
L
 the conditions domC  
L
and C  FinL  C are satised
 is called deductive if im  DLC
L

 An inference operation C  
L
 
L
is compact i C  C
f

 C is completely
compact i C  C
f

Abstract compactness properties can be expressed by conditions compcondC
L
 C  FinL
depending on CC
L
and the nite subsets of the language L Important compactness prop
erties are summarized in the following denition DH

Denition  Let LC
L
 C be a deductive frame
 C is weakly compact i for every X  L	   CX there is a nite subset A  C
L
X
such that   CA
 C is weakly supracompact i for every X  L	   CX and every nite A  C
L
X
there is a nite set B	 A  B  C
L
X such that   CB
 Let F be an inference operation dened for nite sets only 
wsc
F X  f  for
every nite A  C
L
X there is a nite B such that A  B  C
L
X and   F Bg
The concepts in the preceding denition are modications and generalizations of com
pactness notions introduced and studied in FL
 The operator 
wsc
was introduced and
presented in DH
 In the following we show that the extension operator 
wsc
is suitable
for analysing minimal reasoning in partial propositional and partial predicate logic
The set Prop of propositional sentences over  is dened by Prop  L

  f
g Let V  Lit

 and PropV  the smallest set of formulas in L containing V and
 Minimal Reasoning  
closed with respect to  Obviously Prop  PropLit

 Given F  Prop
then litF   the set of literals fromLit

 appearing in F  and litX 
S
flitF   F  Xg
To simplify the notation let ModX be the set of all coherent Herbrand models of X 
X  Prop For a set V  Lit

 let Mod
V
X  fI  V  I  ModXg The deductive
frame under consideration is dened by Prop I
H
c
 jMod
m
c

Proposition  Let V  Lit

	 F  PropV 	 and I  I
H
c
 Then I j F if and only if
I  V j F 
Proof We may assume that F is in negation form The proof is inductively on the complexity
of F  We consider only the case F  A Let I j A then A  I hence A  I  V 
this implies I  V j A Conversely let I  V j A then A  I  V  by assumption
A  V  hence A  I and this implies I j A hence I j A The remaining cases are
straightforward  
Proposition 	 If V  Lit

	 F  PropV 	 then X j F if and only if Mod
V
X 
ModfFg
Proposition 
 Let X  Prop	 V  litX a nite subset Then there is a nite subset
B  C
c
X	 such that litB  V and Mod
V
X  Mod
V
B
Proof Mod
V
X  fI V  I  ModXg is a nite set of cardinality  
cardV 	
 For every
J  Mod
V
X let dJ  
V
J 
V
fl  l  V  Jg and F 
W
fdJ   J  Mod
V
Xg
Then B  fFg satises the desired condition 
Obviously the model operator Mod
m
c
is semantically compact since for every set X the
condition Mod
c
X   implies Mod
m
c
X   In PW it is shown that C
m
c
is not
deductively compact The following simpler example is due to J Dietrich Let Lit


be innite and fp
i
 i  g an enumeration of Lit

 The set X is dened as follows
X  fp
 
    p
i
 p
i 
 p

    i  g Then X j
m
c
p

! p
 
 If I  Mod
m
c
X
then I j p

 m j p
 
 hence I j p

! p
 
 For every nite subset X
f
 X holds
X
f
j
m
c
p

! p
 

Proposition  The deductive frame Prop C
c
 C
m
c
	 is weakly supracompact
Proof Let X j
m
c
F  A  C
c
X A nite and litA litF   fl
 
     l
s
g  V  By propo
sitionh there is a nite subset B  C
c
X such that litB  fl
 
     l
s
g and Mod
V
X 
Mod
V
A  B Let J  Mod
m
V
A  B then J  V  J can be extended to a model I  J 
I  ModX By proposition  there is a minimal model I
 
 Mod
m
V
X such that I
 
 I
By assumption I
 
j F  It is J  I
 
 since J is a minimal model of AB Then J j F i
I
 
j F  hence A B j
m
c
F   
Proposition  Let X  Prop and F  Prop Following conditions are equivalent
 X j
m
c
F 	
 for every nite subset A  C
c
X there exists a nite subset B  C
c
X such that
litB  litA and A B j
m
c
F 
 Sequents and Stable Models  
Proof The implication    follows immediately from proposition  We show
   Using the preciding propositions we construct a sequence A
 
 A

     of nite
sets A
i
 C
c
X such that litF   litA
 
 litA
i
  litA
i 
 lit
S
i
  litX and
Mod
litA
i
	
A
i
  Mod
litA
i
	
X Denote li  litA
i
 Obviously C
c

S
i
A
i
  C
c
X By
assumption for every A
i
there is a B
i
 C
c
X such that litB
i
  litA
i
 and A
i
B
i
j
m
c
F 
It is Mod
li	
A
i
  Mod
li	
A
i
 B
i
 and since litB
i
  litA
I
 it follows ModA
i
 
ModA
i
B
i
 This implies A
i
j
m
c
F  i      
We show that X j
m
c
F  Assume that this is not the case Then there is a I  Mod
m
c
X
such that I j F  Then I  li is not minimimal for A
i
for every i   Let I
i
 I  li
and %i  fJ  J  Mod
li	
A
i
 and J is minimal for A
i
 J  I
i
J  I
i
g Obviously
J j F for every J  %i i   By assumption the sets %i are nonempty for e every
i   For each k   let 'k  fJ  lk  J 
S
ji
%jg Let be ' 
S
k 
'k For
J  ' let be domJ   lk i J  'k and for J
 
J

 ' J
 
v J

if domJ
 
  domJ


and J
 
 J

 domJ
 
 Then 'v is a tree of nite valency Furthermore if J  'k
and j  k then J  lj  'j hence J  lj v J  By K$onigs lemma there is an innite
branch B in 'v and let K 
S
B Obviously K j F  because for every J  %iJ j F 
and J  lj j F for every j  i "From this follows K  I Furthermore K j X  since
K j A
i
 for every i   We show that K  I Assume this is not the case Then there
is a v  XB such that v  K but v  I Then there is a i   such that v  li By
construction there is a J  %j j  i such that K li  J  li but J  I  lj This
gives a contradiction It follows K  I which is a contradiction to the minimality of I  
Proposition  Corollary Let Prop C
c
 C
m
c
 be the deductive frame of minimal rea
soning in partial propositional logic of coherent models Then C
m
c
is completely 
wsc
compact	
ie C
m
c
 
wsc
C
m
c

f

 Sequents and Stable Models
Traditionally Gentzen sequents are used in a schematic way in sequent calculi such as in 		
in order to express valid transitions from one argument schema to another In other words
a sequent in a sequential inference rule stands for a whole class of propositional substitution
instances
In this section we propose to use sequents in a nonschematic way for the purpose of
representing rule knowledge A sequent here is not a schematic but a concrete expression
representing some piece of knowledge
We dene the following classes of sequents
 Seq
 
  fs  Seq jBsHs  Litg
 Seq

  fs  Seq jHs  Lit Bs  XLitg
	 Seq

  fs  Seq jHs  L Bs  L j	g

 Seq

  fs  Seq jHs  L 
 Bs  L j	 
g
We also dene S
 
 fs  S j cardHs  g for every class of sequents S For S  Seq
and   
 c t  we dene the model operators
 Sequents and Stable Models  
Mod

S  fI  I

  I j s for all s  Sg
Mod
H

S  fI  I
H

  I j s for all s  Sg
Mod
H
mi
S  fI  Mod
H

S  I
 
 Mod
H

S sth IncI
 
  IncIg
and their minimal reasoning renements
Mod
m

S  MinMod
H

S
Mod
pm

S  Mod
pm

Mod
m

S S
The associated inference relations are dened as follows
S j
x
y
F i Mod
x
y
S  Mod
y
F 
where x  Hm pm and y  
 c t mi and F  L
Observation  Let B  H be any sequent Then	 for any I  I

	
I j B  H i I j

B 	

H
This observation seems to imply that there is no big dierence between sequents and material
implications since for FG  L it holds that
Mod

F  G  Mod

F 	 G
However for other model operators such as stable models Mod
ms

see below this is not the
case
Example  Sequents dier from material implication
Mod
ms
c
p 	 q  ffpg fqgg  Mod
ms
c
p q  ffqgg
Observation 	 Let S  Seq be a set of sequents Then	
Mod
H

S  Mod
H

S
where S is the Herbrand instantiation of S
Observation 
 Let S  Seq

	 and F  L

 be a closed existential sentence Then	
S j

F i S j

F
 Paraminimal Models for Persistent Sequents
A sequent s  Seq

is called persistent if all body formulas F  Bs are persistent For in
stance all sequents from Seq
 
are persistent For a set S of persistent sequents its paramin
imal models Mod
pm

S are the intended models and thus j
pm
c
resp j
pm
mi
 are the natural
inference relations for consistent resp inconsistent knowledge bases consisting of persistent
sequents
Example 	 Let S  f qb  pa pb px qxg Since
Mod
pm
mi
S  Mod
pm
c
S  ffqb paqagg
 Sequents and Stable Models 

we obtain for   cmi
S j
pm

qa  pb
Observation  For a sequent set S  Seq
 
 
	 where the head of a sequent consists of a
single literal	 and its body of a set of literals	 the notions of minimal and of paraminimal
models coincide	 and there is a unique minimal model	 denoted M
S
 Formally	
Mod
pm

S  Mod
m

S  fM
S
g
Proof We have to show that the interpretationM
S

T
Mod
H

S is a model of S Obvi
ously if it is a model it is the least one
Let B  l  S and M
S
j B By persistence of B we have M
 
j B for every
M
 
 Mod
H

S This implies that l  M
 
for every M
 
 Mod
H

S and hence l  M
S
  
 Stable Models for NonPersistent Sequents
When a knowledge base consists of a set of sequents S  Seq

 where body formulas may be
nonpersistent it may have paraminimal models which are not intended This is illustrated
by the following example
Example 
 Local ClosedWorld Assumption
Let S  f qc  pa pb px  pxg The last sequent	 from pt conclude
pt for any term t	 expresses a local ClosedWorld Assumption which is only admissible
for exact predicates	 ie p  ExRel Since we want to infer pc	 the following paraminimal
models are not intended models
M
 
 fqc pc papbg
M

 fqc pc pbpag
M

 fqc pc pa pbg
Therefore we need a more rened preference criterion which allows to select the intended
models of a set of sequents from its Herbrand models
Denition  M
 
M

  fM  I
H

M
 
MM

g
Recall that wrt a class of interpretations K  we write K j F i I j F for all I  K  We
denote the set of all sequents from a sequent set S which are applicable in K by
S
K
 fs  S K j Bsg
The following denition of a stable model is inspired by the denition of a stable closure of a
set of rules in Wag
a
Denition  Stable Model Let   c 
 M Mod
H

S is called a minimally stable
model of S  Seq

	 symbolically M  Mod
ms

S	 if there is a chain of Herbrand
interpretations M

   M


such that M M


	 and
 M

 
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 For successor ordinals  with     	M

is a minimal extension ofM
 
satisfying
the heads of all sequents whose bodies hold in M
 
M	 ie
M

 MinfI  I
H

 I  M
 
	 and I j

Hs	 fa s  S
M
 
M
g
 For limit ordinals   	
M
	


	
M

Paraminimally stable coherent models are dened accordingly replacing in the denition all
occurences of minimal resp Min by paraminimal resp PMin
 
 The set of minimally
stable models of S is denoted by Mod
ms

S and the set of paraminimally stable models of
S by Mod
pms

S A further interesting class of models is dened by Mod
pm

Mod
ms

S S
Minimally inconsistent stable models are dened by
Mod

mi
S  fI  Mod


S  I
 
 Mod


S sth IncI
 
  IncIg
where   ms pms
Example 
 continued Only the following three paraminimal models of S are stable
M

 fqcpc papbg
M

 fqcpc pbpag
M


 fqcpc pa pbg
and hence	 S j
pms
c
pc
Thus j
pms
c
resp j
pms
mi
 will be our preferred inference relation for knowledgebased reason
ing
Example  Default Rules A default resp exception tolerant rule can be expressed
by a combination of weak and strong negation Eg	 the rule birds normally y is expressed
as
bx fx fx
If the knowledge base S contains in addition the facts that Tweety and Opus are birds	 bT 
bO	 but Opus does not y	 fO	 we can infer by stable reasoning that Tweety ies
S j
pms
mi
fT 
Paraminimally stable reasoning supports inclusive disjunctive information as the following
example shows
Example  Inclusive Disjunction Let S  f p  q  p  q r  sg Then	
Mod
m

S  fpr ps qr qs pqg
Mod
pm

S  fpr ps qr qs pq prs qrs pqr pqs pqrsg
Mod
ms

S  fpr ps qr qsg
Mod
pms

S  fpr ps qr qs pq prs qrsg
 Sequents and Stable Models  
Stable models do not exist in all cases For instance S  fp pg has exactly one minimal
model Mod
m

S  ffpgg which is not stable however A sequent set resp logic program
without stable models will be called unstable
Example  S  fp 	 q  r r pg is unstable
Observation  Stable reasoning is not cumulative
Proof The following counterexample is due to vG Let S  fr  q  q  r  p 
p  r  pg Since Mod
ms

S  ffp qgg and S j
ms

p q but Mod
ms

S  fpg 
ffp qg fp rgg and hence S  fpg j
ms

q  
 Extended Logic Programs as Sequent Sets
A sequent set S  Seq
 

corresponds to an extended logic program ELP
(
S
 fl B  B  l  Sg
The other way around an extended logic program ( corresponds to a sequent set S

 Seq
 

with
S

 fB  l  l B  (g
For B  XLit let B

denote the set of literals which occur weakly negated in B ie
B

 fl  Lit  l  Bg and let B

 fl  Lit  l  Bg It holds that for any
B  XLit

 and any I  I
H


I j B i B

 D
I
& B

D
I
 
Denition 	 Immediate Consequence Operator Let ( be an extended logic pro
gram	 and I  Lit be the diagram of I  I
H

 Then
T

I  fl  Lit

 l B  (	 sth I j Bg
is called the immediate consequence operator associated with (
Denition 
 GelfondLifschitz  Let M  Lit	 and ( be an ELP Then the
GelfondLifschitz transformation of ( with respect to M is dened as
(
M
 fl B

 l B  (	 and B

M  g
M is called an answer set of (	 if Mod
m
c
(
M
  fMg	 and M  D
M

We shall show below that the denition of answer sets is just a specialization of our notion of
a stable model The same holds for the denition of stable models of normal logic programs
in GL Since these denitions are based on the GelfondLifschitztransformation (
M
requiring a specic rule syntax they are not very general as a consequence Gelfond and
Lifschitz are not able to treat negationasfailure as a logical functor and to allow for arbitrary
formulas in the body of a rule The interpretation of negationasfailure as weak negation in
partial logic according to our stable semantics seems to be the rst general logical treatment
of nonmonotonic logic programs
 
It was already proposed by Wagner in Wag Wag
b
but without the full generality of the stable semantics proposed in the present paper
 
There have been many meta	logical 
notably modal logic proposals though
 Conclusion 
Proposition  An answer set of an extended logic program ( is the diagram of a mini
mally stable coherent model of the corresponding sequent set S


Proof sketch LetM  Lit be an answer set of an extended logic program( ie Mod
m
c
(
M
 
fMg where M  D
M
 For (
M
 fl  B  (  M j Bg the immediate consequence
operator T

M
generates M as the supremum of the following chain
M




M

 T

M



M


It is easy to see for all rules l  B  ( that M

j l whenever M
 
M j B simply
because l  T

M

S

M

 whenever
S

M

j B It is also clear that M

is a minimal
in fact the least such extension of M
 
  
Proposition  LetM  Mod
m
c
S be a minimally stable coherent model of a sequent set
S  Seq
 

	 then M  D
M
is an answer set of the corresponding extended logic program (
S

Proof Let Mod
m
c
(
S

M
  fM
 
g We have to show that M
 
 M Denoting M
 

D
M
 
 we rst prove that M
 
 M  Let l  M
 
 ie there is l  B
 
  (
M
 such that
M j B
 
 Then there is a corresponding rule l  B  (
S
 such that B
 
 B

 and
B

M   and consequently M j B implying that l M 
Assume that M is generated by M

     M


 We show by induction on  that
M

 M
 
for    For    we have M

   M
 
 For a sucessor ordinal    # 
let l  M
 
 M

 This means that l  fk  A  k  S & M
 
M j Ag
Consequently there is some rule l  B  (
S
 such that M

M j B implying that
l  B

  (
S

M
 Since by the induction hypthesis M

 M
 
 it follows that M
 
j B


and consequently l M
 

Finally let    be a limes ordinal Then M
	

S
	
M

 M
 
 since by the induction
hypothesis for all    M

M
 
  
Observation  Since an ELP ( may have several minimal models	 it holds that in gen
eral Mod
m

(  Mod
pm

( However	
Mod
ms

(  Mod
pms

(
Proof There is exactly one minimal extension ofM
 
satisfying all heads of sequents from
S
M
 
M
 namely M

 fl  Lit

 l B  S
M
 
M
g  
 Conclusion
Partial model theory being a natural generalization of classical model theory is able to
capture many important distinctions arising in knowledgebased reasoning such as explicit
falsity vs nontruth or exact vs inexact predicates At the object level these distinctions
can be expressed by means of the two negations of partial logic While the strong negation is
useful to express the explicit falsity or incompatibility of some piece of information the weak
negation as a nonpersistent functor can be used to express local ClosedWorld Assumptions
and default rules
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